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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

only to the benefit of the minimum-flow and did not retain any
proprietary rights in the water, the City did not violate the Act or the
contract when it supplied water to communities not named in the
documents.
Thus, the court denied R&R's appeal and affirmed the trial court.
Therefore, the court did not rule on the City's cross-appeal.
JulieE. Hultgren
TENNESSEE
The Pointe, L.L.C. v. Lake Mgmt. Ass'n, No. W2000-0021 1-COA-R3CV, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 771 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2000)
(finding a lake owner's conveyance of property with appurtenances
and adjacent to a lake included the right to use the water).
Lakewood Development Corp. ("LDC") owned both man-made
Garner Lake ("Lake") and its adjacent land. The purpose of the
Lake's creation was to develop the surrounding land into lakeside
LDC conveyed the land underneath the lake to Lake
homes.
Management Ass'n ("LMA"). Likewise, LDC conveyed the adjacent
land to two individuals, who later formed The Pointe, L.L.C. ("The
Pointe"), in order to develop the property. The Pointe's deed
included "all the appurtenances and hereditaments thereunto."
LMA sought to impose restrictions and fees on adjacent
landowners. In response, The Pointe filed a declarative action to
determine whether it could access and use the Lake without paying
fees to LMA. LMA responded with a motion for summary judgment.
The trial court granted LMA's summary judgment motion. The Pointe
appealed.
To determine the propriety of summary judgment, the Court of
Appeals of Tennessee first determined whether the deed's language
entitled The Pointe to unrestricted use and enjoyment of the Lake.
The court found The Pointe's three theories for its legal right to
unrestricted use-appurtenances, riparian rights, and implied
easements-were related. The three theories described methods
through which a property owner may use something to enhance the
enjoyment of the property. The court determined The Pointe
acquired the right to use freely the Lake as an appurtenance to the
riparian property it owned. Further, the right was in the form of an
implied easement.
The court determined the appurtenance within the deed included
the right to use the Lake. The court recognized that an appurtenance
in a deed is meant to enhance the property. The riparian land's
inherent value arose from its proximity and accessibility to the water.
Furthermore, when a grantor conveys property adjacent to water, a
court presumes the right to use and enjoy water accompanies the
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grant. Moreover, a conveyance of adjacent land, done by the owner of
both the water and the surrounding land, transfers riparian rights,
absent express provisions to the contrary. As the Lake was an
appurtenance to the deed and the deed did not exclude use of the
Lake, the court concluded The Pointe was entitled to free use of the
Lake.
LMA argued the non-navigability of the Lake prevented riparian
rights from passing in the deed. The court noted that navigability only
served to determine ownership of land under the water, and riparian
rights concerning use do attach to non-navigable water.
The court then addressed the nature and extent of The Pointe's
rights. The court acknowledged that the party attempting to prove an
implied easement existed must demonstrate three factors. First, the
party must show a separation of title occurred. The court found
separation of title occurred when LDC transferred the property to The
Pointe and LMA. Second, the party must demonstrate the use
continued over a long period. The court found over thirty years prior
to LDC's transfer, LDC created the Lake specifically to develop
lakeside homes on the adjacent property. Finally, the party must show
the easement was necessary for further enjoyment of the land. The
court noted that without access to the Lake, the property would be
useless for lakeside development. Therefore, the court held The
Pointe's rights to use the Lake were in the form of an implied
easement.
Sara Wagers
TEXAS
Dyegard Land P'ship v. Hoover, 39 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. App. 2001)
(holding original covenants prohibiting drilling for minerals did not
prohibit lot owners from drilling water wells because water is not a
mineral).
In May 1994, Dyegard Land Partnership ("Dyegard") with the
approval of Oak View Estates, a rural subdivision, filed a subdivision
plat and restrictive covenants with the Parker County Clerk. The
thirty-eight covenants restricted building design, construction
materials, and property use. Covenant eighteen expressly prohibited,
on any lot within Oak View Estates, the drilling, quarrying, mining,
prospecting, or development of minerals of any kind, and the
construction of wells, tunnels, tanks or any other structure used for
mineral boring.
In 1997, Robert and Jackie Hoover and Donald and Cynthia Tye
(collectively, the "Hoovers") purchased lots from Dyegard with notice
that their lots were subject to the original covenants.
Dyegard
provided Oak View Estates with water from a central water system.
After purchasing the lots, the Hoovers discovered problems with

